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1. ABSTRACT 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Dryden Flight Research Center (Edwards, 
California) completed flight-testing of adaptive controls research on the Full-Scale Advanced 
Systems Testbed (FAST) in January of 2011. The research addressed the technical challenges 
involved with reducing risk in an increasingly complex and dynamic national airspace. Specific 
challenges lie within the development of validated, multidisciplinary, integrated aircraft control 
design tools and techniques that will enable safe flight in the presence of adverse conditions 
such as structural damage, control surface failures, or aerodynamic upsets. The testbed is an 
F-18 airplane (McDonnell Douglas, now The Boeing Company, Chicago, Illinois) serving as a 
full-scale vehicle to test and validate adaptive flight control research, and lends significant 
confidence to the development, maturation, and acceptance process of incorporating adaptive 
control laws into follow-on research and ultimately the operational environment. The 
experimental systems integrated into the Full-Scale Advanced Systems Testbed were designed 
for flexible yet safe flight-test evaluation and validation and revolve around two major hardware 
upgrades: the modification of flight control computers and integration of two fourth-generation 
Airborne Research Test Systems. Flight validation of these systems provided the foundation for 
Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion and Model Reference Aircraft Control adaptive control law 
experiments. To ensure success of flight in terms of cost, schedule, and test results, emphasis 
on risk management was incorporated into the early stages of design and flight-test planning 
and continued through the execution of each flight-test mission. Specific consideration was 
made to incorporate safety through hardware and software features, test processes, and 
training to reduce the human factors impact to safe and successful flight-testing. This paper 
describes the research configuration, experiment functionality, overall risk mitigations, flight-test 
approach and results, and lessons learned from the adaptive controls research of the Full-Scale 
Advanced Systems Testbed. 
2. NOMENCLATURE 
 
1553 Mil-Std-1553 data bus 
68040 research flight control computer processor 
701E production flight control computer processor 
ail aileron 
ARTS IV Airborne Research Test System, 4th Generation 
CAT Choose-A-Test 
cmd command 
DAG Dial-A-Gain 
DDI Digital Display Indicator 
DFRC Dryden Flight Research Center 
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DPRAM dual-port random access memory 
FAST Full-Scaled Advanced Systems Testbed 
FCC flight control computer 
FCS flight control Surface 
FDMS Flight Deflection Measurement System 
GTM ground-test mode 
HILS hardware-in-the-loop simulation 
IRAC Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control 
KIAS Knots Indicated Airspeed 
LCD liquid crystal display 
LEF leading edge flap  
MRAC Model Reference Adaptive Control 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NDI Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion 
NWS Nosewheel Steering 
PLA power lever angle  
OBES On-Board Excitation System 
PSFCC Production Support Flight Control Computer 
PVI pilot-vehicle interface 
RFCS research flight control system 
RS-422 twisted pair data transmission American National Standards Institute standard 
rud rudder 
SARE Simple ARTS IV Research Experiment 
stab stabilator 
TEF trailing edge flap  
 
3. INTRODUCTION 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Dryden Flight Research Center 
(DFRC) (Edwards, California) completed adaptive flight control research flight-testing in January 
2011 in support of the Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) project. The project aimed to 
address technical challenges of the NASA Aviation Safety Program involving the development 
of validated, multidisciplinary, integrated aircraft control design tools and techniques to enable 
safe flight in the presence of adverse conditions such as structural damage, control surface 
failures, icing, or aerodynamic upsets. Such adaptive control research ultimately supports the 
ability to reduce risk in an increasingly complex and dynamic national airspace.  
 
Full-scale flight research is critical to the development, maturation, and acceptance of adaptive 
control laws for both future research and use in the operational environment; it also provides the 
capability of piloted evaluations and exploration of unanticipated human-algorithm interactions in 
flight. To facilitate full-scale testing of IRAC adaptive control technologies, supporting hardware 
and software was incorporated into the NASA F-18 airplane (McDonnell Douglas, now The 
Boeing Company, Chicago, Illinois), tail number 853, termed the Full-Scale Advanced Systems 
Testbed (FAST). The testbed was identified as a principal asset for the anticipated research for 
three key reasons: 1) the pre- and post-departure characteristics of this airplane are already 
well understood; 2) the platform has a robust capability to recover from unusual attitudes and 
departures; and 3) significant research instrumentation has been incorporated into the testbed 
from previous research flight-testing. 
 
The effort utilized a build-up approach to integration and testing, culminating in the in-flight 
evaluation of a Model Reference Adaptive Controller (MRAC) designed to evaluate whether a 
 
 
very simple adaptive control algorithm can be adequately tested using traditional flight 
qualification methods and still serve as a useful level of safety enhancement to flight control. 
4. RESEARCH CONFIGURATION 
 
To allow for flexible yet safe flight-test evaluation and validation of modern adaptive control 
technologies, several experimental systems were integrated into FAST. Two major hardware 
upgrades included the modification of flight control computers (FCCs) and the integration of two 
dual-redundant, fourth-generation Airborne Research Test Systems (ARTS IV).  
 
4.1. Flight control computer modifications 
Unmodified FCCs are quad-redundant and incorporate 701E processors.1 Previous Active 
Aeroelastic Wing (AAW)2 project modifications incorporated a Motorola 68040 research 
processor (Motorola Solutions, Inc., Schaumburg, Illinois) into each channel of the FCCs and 
dual-port random access memory (DPRAM) and software interfacing between the 701E and 
68040. The 68040 hardware and software combination comprises the research flight control 
system (RFCS) and the modified FCCs are termed Production Support FCCs (PSFCCs). The 
RFCS can perform fading between experiments and production control laws, execute replicated 
F-18 production control laws, monitor research disengage limits, pass state data and replication 
control law commands to the ARTS IV units, receive experimental control law commands from 
the ARTS IV units, and provide actuator commands and RFCS state information to an 
instrumentation downlink.  
 
4.2. Airborne Research Test System IV 
Two dual-redundant ARTS IV units installed in the front fuselage of the FAST airplane are 
designed to provide the flexibility needed for quick software development, testing, integration, 
and validation. The units augment the RFCS by providing external input/output, internal 
memory, and additional processing power. Operating in parallel, the units communicate with five 
external systems: 1) RFCS 68040 software; 2) instrumentation; 3) embedded global positioning 
system (GPS) and inertial navigation system (EGI); 4) pilot-vehicle interface (PVI); and 5) 
payloads. The general research interface architecture interfacing with the RFCS and ARTS IV 
systems is shown in figure 1. 
 
Experimental software hosted in the RFCS and ARTS IV computers has the capability to 
exercise full control over aircraft flight control surfaces and throttle levers. Up to eight 
experiments may run simultaneously. Only one out of the potential eight is designated as the 
controlling experiment and can command the aircraft actuators. Communication between 
experiments, however, is set up to allow inputs to the controlling experiment as needed.  
 
The RFCS and ARTS IV research hardware and software upgrades also tie into extensive 
pre-established research instrumentation that includes loads, dynamics, and aerodynamic 
parameters that are available to the instrumentation downlink for real-time or post-flight 
analysis.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Full-Scale Advanced System Testbed research flight control system interface 
architecture. 
 
Further design features include a PVI installed below the Up Front Controls in the cockpit that 
provides visual feedback to the pilot by means of a 2-by-20-character backlit liquid crystal 
display (LCD) as shown in figure 2. The PVI displays ARTS IV interpretations of proper 
experiment selection inputs, experiment modes, system status, and ARTS IV health messages.  
 
 
Figure 2. The pilot vehicle interface unit with liquid crystal display. 
 
5. EXPERIMENT MODES, STATES, AND EXPERIMENT CAPABILITIES 
Several experiment modes are available that further facilitate flexible yet safe flight-test 
evaluation of adaptive control technologies. A ground-test mode (GTM) provides the means for 
functional systems verification testing of the RFCS and ARTS IV units before flight. In flight, 
 
 
three experimental modes affect the way in which RFCS replication control law commands are 
combined with commands from the ARTS IV units. Once an experimental mode is selected, 
RFCS states provide a safe mechanism for transitioning between production and research 
control laws, and provide situational awareness of the operational status of the experimental 
mode to the pilot. Different selectable experiment capabilities are available depending on the 
experiment mode. Experiment capabilities are selected in a predefined approach that 
incorporates several checks and balances for increased risk mitigation. 
 
5.1. Experiment modes 
The research control laws can run in three research experiment modes: RFCS Primary, 
RFCS/ARTS mixed mode, and ARTS Primary. In RFCS Primary mode, F-18 production control 
laws replicated within the RFCS provide surface and throttle commands to the 701E; all ARTS 
IV commands are ignored. In the RFCS/ARTS mixed mode, surface and throttle commands 
from the RFCS replication control laws are merged with commands from the ARTS IV and sent 
to the 701E. In ARTS Primary mode, the ARTS IV performs all control law calculations internally 
and ARTS IV control surface and throttle commands replace RFCS control law commands. In 
all modes, however, the RFCS safety monitors all commands.  
 
5.2. States 
There are three RFCS states which ultimately describe the transfer of control between the 701E 
and the RFCS: 1) disengaged; 2) armed; and 3) engaged. Experiment selection occurs in the 
disengaged state while the 701E maintains control over the primary flight control system and no 
replication control law commands are generated by the RFCS. A research-modified flight control 
surface (FCS) page shows the traditional control surface health status and RFCS state data 
(figure 3).  This page supplements the standard F-18 FCS page and integrated PVI for 
additional aircraft and research state information relay to the pilot.   
 
 
Figure 3. Depiction of Digital Display Indicator showing research flight control system page.  
 
The button representing “A” on the Digital Display Indicator (DDI) is reserved for arming the 
RFCS.  In the armed state, the 68040 processor begins to generate replication control law 
 
 
commands while the 701E retains control over the primary flight control system. Upon arming, 
the “ARM” indication is displayed on the research FCS page.  If an incorrect experiment 
selection sequence is entered, the software will not allow subsequent arming of the RFCS. A 
single depression of the Nosewheel Steering (NWS) button from the armed state is required to 
engage the research. In the engaged state, command of aircraft control is handed over from the 
701E to the RFCS and the “ARM” indication on the research FCS page is replaced with “1234.”  
 
5.3. Experiment capabilities and experiment selection 
Each experiment mode houses selectable experiment capabilities that support RFCS and ARTS 
IV checkout flights. Several of these capabilities reside in the RFCS and include replicated F-18 
production control laws. The replication control laws were used to conduct back-to-back 
comparisons of flight dynamics with the 701E to ensure that the RFCS did not introduce any 
undesirable effects. Use of an additional system called the On-Board Excitation System (OBES) 
added programmed digital signals to the control system actuator commands for excitation of 
aircraft dynamics. Excitation maneuvers for OBES include both collective and differential 
doublets of individual control surfaces, frequency sweeps of rudders, flaps, and throttles, and 
doublets injected into the pilot’s stick, pedal, and throttle inceptor paths. Five combinations of 
simulated control surface failures are also programmed into the RFCS with the addition of four 
varying levels of simulated damaged wing scenarios.3 Each was designed to present varying 
levels of challenging yet controllable failure scenarios. Selected simulated failures and OBES 
maneuvers were evaluated in RFCS Primary mode to validate proper baseline RFCS-701E 
command logic. 
 
A Simulink (The MathWorks, Natick, Massachuestts) generated Simple ARTS IV Research 
Experiment (SARE) was used to verify operation of the RFCS/ARTS mixed mode. The purpose 
of the SARE was to either inject OBES maneuvers into the pilot command path to the RFCS 
replication control laws or the surface command path from the RFCS replication control laws. 
Testing of the SARE signified the first in-flight execution of an ARTS IV controlling experiment 
and validated ARTS IV capabilities. 
 
The ARTS Primary mode was validated using ARTS IV Pass-Thru experiments. The Pass-Thru 
experiments receive control surface commands generated within the RFCS but not initially sent 
to the 701E. Instead, the ARTS IV passes the commands back to the RFCS unaltered, where 
they are loaded into the DPRAM and read by the 701E.  
 
The experiment capabilities residing in the RFCS or ARTS IV units are selected by the pilot 
through Dial-a-Gain (DAG) and Choose-a-Test (CAT) entries using the standard F-18 DDIs in 
the cockpit. The DDI buttons representing “B,” “C,” and “D” are used to select a particular 
experiment capability correlating to predefined  DAG (0-26) or CAT (0-26) number pair 
sequences stored in memory.  Table 1 outlines the DAG/CAT flight configurations available for 
each experimental mode. 
 
 
Table 1(a). The Dial-A-Gain flight configurations.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1(b). The Choose-A-Test flight configurations. 
 
6. RISK MITIGATION TECHNIQUES 
Up-front and continued risk management is a key component to safe and successful flight-
testing. Risk management involves the identification of risks, assessment of their impact, and 
implementation of tailored mitigations to minimize, monitor, or eliminate the credibility of risk. 
Effective risk management can control the probability or impact, or both, to test successes. 
Common risk management techniques include bounding risk through design features, utilizing a 
systematic build-up approach, incorporating thoroughly documented processes and procedures, 
and establishing a safety-focused test team. Several key risk mitigations implemented for the 
IRAC project are discussed below. 
 
6.1. Bounding risk  
The foundational approach to risk mitigation for the project was to reduce or eliminate 
unnecessary risk.  This was achieved through the determination to conduct testing while in 
RFCS armed or engaged states within the Class B envelope depicted in figure 4. The phrase 
“Class B” refers to a predetermined flight envelope associated with a NASA DFRC flight 
qualification level of software that is considered mission critical (Level B) rather than safety 
critical (Level A).3 Analysis showed that test points within the Class B envelope would not 
produce transients exceeding aircraft load limits should maximum rate deflections of all control 
surfaces to their position limits, known as a “hard-over,” occur. Operating within this flight 
envelope minimizes structural concerns while providing sufficient altitude for recovery from 
unusual attitudes.  Therefore, operating within this flight envelope bounded risk to an acceptable 
level.  
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Figure 4. The Class B flight envelope and the Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control project flight 
conditions. 
 
Another technique used to bound risk and reduce single-point failures is to design-in safety 
mitigations. Several design features were incorporated into the research architecture to alleviate 
or significantly reduce pilot and mission control personnel workload during testing and improve 
situational awareness for increased safety and higher data quality acquisition.  For example, the 
Class B envelope was enforced automatically by RFCS software disengage limits.  Although 
these limits were also monitored in the mission control center in real time, these software-
enforced limits reduced dependency on pilot reaction time to disengage the system if a failure 
occurred.  
 
Another important safety feature incorporated into the design of the research software 
architecture is the three-stage RFCS state transition to engagement described above. This 
offers an additional measure of safety by requiring two distinct inputs by the pilot to completely 
transition control of the flight control system to the RFCS. Furthermore, the system is designed 
to register disengagement whenever the pilot executes any one of several manual 
disengagement options, including depressing the Autopilot Disengage Switch, positioning the 
flap switch to full or half, or pulling any single FCS breaker, to name a few. By incorporating 
several manual disengagement options the project pilot or project team is always the ultimate 
controller of the research while eliminating single-point failures. 
 
The ARTS IV software also offers an additional built-in risk mitigation feature: all output signal 
checks apply a DFRC-designed “floating limiter” on commands to limit the potential for a 
hard-over. Within the floating limiter, shown in figure 5, a maximum drift rate or rate of change is 
designed into the limiter. When a signal exceeds its specified maximum drift rate, the floating 
limiter boundary is hit and this signal is rate-limited, thus preventing a hard-over.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Airborne Research Test System, 4th Generation, floating limiter. 
 
Despite the benefits of up-front risk mitigations their full potential may not be achieved if 
thorough end-to-end requirements supporting final design decisions are not properly scoped.  
For example, the PVI LCD was chosen without pilot input prior to procurement. The display 
proved to be limited in available character spacing to display all ARTS IV desired status 
information to the pilots. This resulted in abbreviated character representation (figure 6).  In 
some instances, desired display data had to be altogether excluded, such as RFCS 
auto-disengagement flags.  Furthermore, available installation locations were limited to forward 
of the control stick and below the DDIs in the cockpit.  This location combined with sun glare 
made the PVI unreadable during some flight maneuvers.  Flight test evaluations prior to final 
installation to evaluate configuration and flight environment impacts would have provided helpful 
design upgrades to produce a more universally applicable display.  For example, the display 
could have incorporated an angled display for a clearer screen view.   
 
 
Figure 6. Example of pilot vehicle interface liquid crystal display character design 
 
Flight test card development and test point sequencing served as another example of built-in 
risk mitigation, albeit through procedure documentation rather than design.  Several verification 
checkpoints were incorporated into the flight test cards at key test point execution stages to 
ensure proper situational awareness of the state and operation of the research for both the pilot 
and mission control center personnel.  Verification checkpoints included approvals to proceed 
from system level engineers to the flight director with hand-off to the mission controller and 
ultimately the pilot.  In addition, DDI entries for experiment capability selection and state 
 
 
transitions, and NWS inputs for RFCS engagement were performed with step-by-step 
verification checkpoints as described above to augment the limited situational awareness 
provided by the PVI display.  A secondary benefit to this approach is that test card execution 
points and checkpoints provided an expected cadence representing efficient flight-testing.  This 
served as a metric to evaluate team situational awareness and readiness.  For example, it was 
observed that after unexpected research disengagements, whether manual or automatic, the 
cadence was affected and more prompting to control room personnel or the pilot was needed.  
These cues may have been indicative of a lack of readiness to proceed and serve as an 
evaluation point for a flight-test pause to refocus the test team.  Specific recommendation is 
made to incorporate cadence metrics, when appropriate, to obtain human factor cues that can 
indicate stress risers which may affect flight-test safety or efficiency.  
 
6.2. Build-up approach to integration and testing 
Component and system-level testing provides valuable verification of proper functionality that 
lends considerable confidence to success in the final flight-test environment. Several testing 
efforts were conducted both at outside agency facilities responsible for the research 
modifications as well as at DFRC. After traditional component and system level acceptance and 
electromagnetic compatibility/interference testing was completed on the research components, 
emphasis was placed on simulation testing. 
 
The Boeing Company headed FCC modifications and RFCS integration with the bulk of RFCS 
component-level testing occurring at their St. Louis, Missouri facility. Hardware-in-the-loop 
Simulation (HILS) testing preceded combined RFCS-ARTS IV integration testing at Boeing to 
verify the mechanization of the RFCS in an integrated closed-loop environment with a 
six-degrees-of-freedom aircraft simulation. In addition, Boeing HILS testing was performed by 
NASA DFRC project pilots to evaluate flying qualities with mission-representational pilot 
command inputs. This participation also provided flight familiarization for the project pilots and 
the opportunity for researchers to obtain early experiment performance feedback.  
Additional DFRC hardware and software-configurable simulation testing included duplicated 
Boeing HILS test cases, RFCS flight operating envelope limit checks, and back-to-back RFCS 
and F-18 production control law comparisons. To validate the simulation, a series of time history 
check cases were generated for each simulation release and over-plotted against the previous 
release to confirm that no unexpected changes to the dynamics were introduced into the 
system.  
 
The available resource of the DFRC simulation prompted evaluation to assess its applicability to 
serve as a build-up approach tool for the implementation of additional safety mitigations.  
Evaluation of this potential culminated in the implantation of pre-mission rules that outlined the 
project approach toward verifying the acceptability of proposed test points for a given research 
mission prior to flight by means of specific simulation testing.  Such rules mandated the tracking 
and verification of test card points and DAG/CAT functionality in the piloted simulation prior to 
flight. Furthermore, these rules required project pilot evaluation rather than engineering to aid in 
pilot familiarity of the test approach outlined in the test cards and to gain a perspective on 
expected transients given typical pilot inputs. Traditional mission rules are implemented to 
mitigate identified research hazards with respect to adverse human, asset, or mission impacts 
during flight-testing.  The DFRC simulation provided an opportunity to incorporate additional 
build-up approach stepping stones and enhanced safety oversight in support of successful flight 
testing beyond traditional mitigations. 
 
 
 
Further use of the DFRC simulation as a build-up approach tool involved training for non-project 
specific pilots whose experiment evaluation feedback aided in obtaining well-rounded test 
results from a variable-gain test pilot pool.  Such training incorporated discipline and mission 
controller participation to exercise expected test point cadence and prompting.  Additional 
required familiarization included participation as chase aircraft pilot to hear real-time flight-test 
prompts and visually assess expected transients.  The benefit to this approach was realized 
during HILS testing as a low-gain pilot discovered an adaptive controller problem that neither 
the other pilots nor research engineers had discovered. It was found that with a constant non-
zero stick input and no roll motion, the MRAC gains tended to saturate.  This destabilized the 
roll axis and resulted in a pilot-induced oscillation in that axis.  Although a high-pass filter for 
lateral stick commands could have been incorporated into the controller logic, the issue was 
mitigated through gain parameter monitoring in the mission control center in real time for gain 
parameter saturation and contact lateral stick position.  If either were detected, a “knock-it-off” 
call was issued to the pilot to cease test point execution and manually disengaged out of the 
RFCS.   
 
Despite the recognized benefits of the DFRC simulation application, a shortfall of the approach 
was revealed during flight-testing.  Often test point evaluation in the simulation omitted 
traditional in-flight test point set-up techniques or evaluation much outside the boundaries of the 
test point.  Due to this reduced scope in simulation testing, several nuisances were found such 
as what were described to be “pitch bobbles” while setting up for air-to-air tracking task 
maneuvers during MRAC flight testing.  Although this finding was determined to be a nuisance, 
it highlighted the potential for unrealized safety problems if simulation testing is too narrowly 
scoped.  When appropriate, test planning should incorporate safety-of-flight verification of 
control laws beyond the intended flight-test point to include test point set-up maneuvers in 
preparation for unanticipated human algorithm interactions. 
 
6.3. Team cohesion 
Team cohesion promotes effective communication and improves planning efforts that are 
essential to cultivating a safety-conscious test team.  The project team focused on thoroughly 
vetted and well-documented policies and procedures to promote group cohesion.  For example, 
a project contingency management plan was documented and rehearsed using project team 
members and project pilots during a combined system test to increase mission control center 
familiarity and reinforce the need for quick, rational decisions in a high-stress environment. 
Building up to this demonstration, project personnel participated in Crew Resource Management 
training.  All efforts culminated in a documented control room training plan outlining the roles 
and responsibilities of the project team members in the mission control center. The plan 
described proper communication to identify inoperative mission parameters, circumstances 
requiring an immediate return to base, familiarity with incident response checklists, training 
requirements for discipline backup personnel, display change rules, and interdisciplinary 
communications.  These efforts instilled project personnel with confidence and group trust, and 
reinforced a safety-first test team culture.  Clearly communicated and documented policies and 
procedures also provide ease of flexibility to adapt to changing flight test goals.  For example, 
implemented mission rules were incorporated into a project document that included project 
implementation rationale and the criteria for removing the rule.  This practice provided a clear 
metric for determining which rules were applicable to a given flight-test regime, rather than 
carrying unnecessary limitations that could impact data quality or induce needless interruptions 
to test point execution. 
 
 
 
 
7. FLIGHT-TEST APPROACH AND RESULTS 
Implementation of a build-up approach to flight-testing, as with integration and test, is useful in 
the identification of potential unexpected hazards or threats to the technical integrity of the 
research under test. Each step progressively brings the outcome into focus with a clarity that is 
not possible from the beginning. A general build-up approach toward increased research 
complexity was implemented to verify proper component and system functionality, manage risk, 
and allow the project team to gain experience with test procedures and the general functionality 
of the research systems.  An aggressive flight schedule, shown in table 2, was attainable 
because of the design of the ARTS IV and RFCS architecture, aircraft robustness especially 
within the Class B envelope, team cohesion, and documented processes. 
 
 
Table 2. Verification and Validation schedule of the Full-Scale Advanced Systems Testbed 
 
7.1. Baseline checkouts 
Several baseline checkout flights in the upgraded instrumentation and 701E configuration were 
accomplished in late 2009. When the baseline checkout flights were completed, unmodified 
FCCs were swapped for the PSFCCs that incorporated the RFCS.  
 
7.2. Research Flight Control System and Airborne Research Test System IV 
checkouts 
Subsequent research validation flights followed the build-up approach as the RFCS Primary, 
RFCS/ARTS mixed mode, and ARTS Primary modes were validated sequentially. Prior to the 
start of RFCS Primary flights, however, a combined systems test was conducted to serve as an 
end-to-end check between the aircraft research systems and the mission control center. This 
test verified proper research and mission control center display functionality as well as verified 
no adverse electromagnetic compatibility or interference during external or internal aircraft 
power. As a stepping-stone to each flight, a GTM preflight check was performed. The GTM 
check supplemented the standard F-18 pre-taxi checks and permitted research engagement 
when weight-on-wheels and throttles idle were “true.” The GTM checks exercise the command 
and response communication between the mission control center and the pilot, animate 
mission- or safety-critical parameters on mission control center displays, and confirm proper 
arm, engage, and disengagement operation of the RFCS prior to takeoff. Initial RFCS Primary 
in-flight checks repeated validation of arming (including failed arming attempts), disarming, 
engagement, and both manual and automatic disengagement attempts specific to the RFCS. A 
subset of test points performed in the Boeing and Dryden HILS were flown with the intention of 
confirming the accuracy of the HILS results. Flight dynamic maneuvers followed functionality 
checks within the same flight and included typical maneuvers such as doublets, pitch and bank 
 
 
captures, steady-heading sideslips, 360-degree rolls, 2-g loaded rolls, and 2.5-g wind-up turns. 
Back-to-back comparisons of the flight dynamics between the 701E control laws and the RFCS 
control laws were performed to confirm that the RFCS control laws replicated the production 
control laws in the 701E within expectations. Further testing included a subset of OBES 
maneuvers and simulated failures programmed into the RFCS. A total of three RFCS Primary 
checkout flights were performed in April of 2010. 
 
After the RFCS Primary mode in-flight validation flights were completed, the integration and 
ground-testing of the ARTS IV units, PVI, and associated instrumentation system commenced 
using the RFCS/ARTS mixed mode and ARTS Primary research modes. Since integration of 
the additional research hardware required a break in the previously-documented configuration, 
an additional combined systems test was conducted. Post-flight evaluation of the combined 
systems test data revealed that a stabilator hard-over occurred upon disengagement of the 
RFCS/ARTS mixed mode as the 701E commanded the horizontal stabilator to its 
trailing-edge-down limit. Upon re-arming and engaging, the RFCS and ARTS IV software 
retained the trailing-edge-down command limit to the stabilators. This finding prompted 
immediate flight grounding and additional testing until the behavior could be better understood. 
The additional testing showed that the surface positions were commanded based on the design 
of the forward-loop integrator in the pitch axis of the 701E control laws as well as the 
compensation required during engagement and disengagement of the RFCS control laws. The 
project team determined that engaging RFCS in GTM may cause the 701E integrator to be pre-
seeded with an improper value upon RFCS disengagement. The effect was deemed a 
“nuisance” when in GTM and not a safety-of-flight problem within the Class B envelope. The 
combined systems test finding served as a role-model event that highlighted attention to detail, 
non-complacency, willingness to identify potential safety concerns, and a dedication to resolving 
problems effectively among project team members. The event ultimately stressed the 
importance of training, team cohesion, and adherence to policies and procedures.  
 
RFCS/ARTS mixed mode and ARTS Primary mode research flights involved similar pre-taxi and 
in-flight arming or disarming, and engage or disengage checks as were performed during RFCS 
Primary checkout flights.  Subsequent testing included checkout of the PVI as well as SARE 
experiments specific to the ARTS IV units.  The ARTS IV Pass-Thru experiment capability was 
tested in the ARTS Primary mode. This experiment validated ARTS IV operation, timing, failure 
annunciation, and integration of the ARTS IV units with the 701E-RFCS system. Similar to the 
RFCS Primary mode, flight dynamic maneuvers were used to evaluate back-to-back 
comparisons of the Pass-Thru experiment and RFCS control laws to ensure that ARTS IV 
processing and communication with RFCS did not introduce any excessive time delay. During 
ARTS Primary mode experiment capability testing, candidate handling qualities tasks were 
developed to better assess future experiments. Handling qualities tasks included wingtip 
formation flight, in-trail formation flight, and 2-g air-to-air tracking tasks. At this stage, formation 
tasks were evaluated exclusively using 701E production control laws; however, 2-g air-to-air 
tracking tasks were performed in both 701E and RFCS Primary mode.  
 
Checkout of the RFCS/ARTS mixed mode and ARTS Primary experimental modes were 
completed after two flights in August and September of 2010. Flight data showed that the RFCS 
and ARTS IV software behaved as expected with only minor discrepancies noted. Overall, 
results showed good flight-to-simulation match. Completion of the research mode flight tests laid 
the groundwork for follow-on flight-testing of Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion (NDI) and MRAC 
controllers. 
 
 
 
 
7.3. Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion controller 
Several standard flight control designs are largely linear control laws with integrated nonlinear 
elements to account for real-world vehicle dynamics and handling qualities requirements. 
Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion is a technique for control law design based on feedback 
linearization to achieve desired dynamic response characteristics.4  
 
An NDI control law was loaded into the ARTS IV system for flight-test validation as the baseline 
control law to enable follow-on MRAC flight-testing and validation. The primary goals of NDI 
flight-testing were to demonstrate that the NDI control law was well suited to support 
subsequent MRAC flights, demonstrate the RFCS and ARTS IV capability in ARTS Primary 
mode with a closed-loop control law, and explore the accuracy of the current prediction tools for 
the effectiveness of non-conventional control surface mixing.4  
 
As with previous hardware or software configuration changes, ground verification and validation 
tests of the NDI control law were conducted. Ground-test results showed good software and 
hardware correlations. This lent strong support for continued software simulation usage for 
robustness check cases. In addition, sufficient stability margins were noted within the Class B 
envelope for all robustness cases.  
 
The bulk of the flight-testing was intended to show that the NDI controller behaves the same 
way in flight as in the simulation and to highlight any handling qualities deficiencies that may 
adversely affect the MRAC research.4 Typical test maneuvers were employed at multiple flight 
conditions within the Class B envelope and included maneuvers such as piloted frequency 
sweeps, speed brake deployment, 3-axis doublets, pitch and bank captures, steady-heading 
side slips, 360-degree rolls, 2-g loaded rolls, 2.5-g wind-up turns, and disengagement transient 
testing. Furthermore, experiment configurations were selected to show that the NDI control law 
was robust enough to remain controllable for a variety of simulated failure conditions such as 
pitch axis control effectiveness failures, failures that result in cross-axis coupling, and failures 
that result in undesirable open-loop dynamics.4 Tracking performance and handling qualities 
tasks were also performed at nominal conditions to verify that the NDI was an adequate 
baseline controller for future MRAC testing. In-trail formation flight tasks and 2-g air-to-air 
tracking tasks were performed as previously described for both gross acquisition and fine 
tracking. Tracking task performance was evaluated by the pilots using Cooper-Harper and 
pilot-induced oscillation rating scales.5  
 
Five NDI checkout flights throughout September and October of 2010 were completed with the 
participation of three project pilots. Overall, flight-test results verified that the NDI control law 
had good characteristics in a range of flight conditions throughout the Class B envelope.6 
General NDI behavior showed equivalent baseline control law handling qualities aside from 
minor deficiencies such as heavier stick forces.6 The success of the baseline NDI controller 
gave the “green light” to proceed with in-flight demonstration of the strengths and weaknesses 
of a simple “textbook” MRAC. 
 
7.4. Model Reference Adaptive Controller 
 
The MRAC experiment was developed to further the acceptance of adaptive controls as a 
means for improving the safety of future aircraft designs in the event of damage or failures of 
onboard systems. Conventional methods used for verification and validation testing of flight 
controls software rely upon predictable responses to test scenarios and are ensured by control 
gains that are either fixed or scheduled via a predefined lookup table or function. Adaptive flight 
 
 
controls incorporate time-varying gains, however, whose values are less easy to predict and 
which impose difficulty in flight qualification to a safety-critical level. In response to this difficulty, 
the MRAC experiment was designed to evaluate whether a very simple adaptive control 
algorithm can be adequately tested using traditional flight qualification methods and still serve 
as a useful level of safety enhancement to flight control. 
 
The MRAC contains three modes of varying levels of complexity.7 The simplest control mode 
(sMRAC) has a single adaptive gain in each of the pitch and roll axes. The second control mode 
(onMRAC) retains the same number of adaptive gains while introducing additional complexity 
into the algorithm that adjusts the values of the gains in response to undesirable aircraft 
dynamics. The third control mode (onMRAC+) adds a second adaptive gain in each axis to 
account for failures or damage scenarios that exhibit undesirable coupling between the axes. 
Each controller mode was evaluated against a suite of simulated failures, ranging from changes 
to the aircraft's pitch and roll damping to failures that introduced significant coupling between 
the axes. Flight-test maneuvers and handling qualities evaluations were also performed with 
tasks similar to the NDI flight-test regime across five pilots and ten research flights.3  
 
Challenges were realized that influenced result consistency despite the benefits of previously 
well-defined handling qualities tasks, test point reordering to reduce anticipated responses, and 
pilot practice of expected maneuvers. For example, handling quality and nuisance scale ratings 
from pilot feedback showed a noticeable disparity between the ability of some pilots to adapt to 
simulated failures. The nuisance scale was similar in scope to the Cooper-Harper and pilot-
induced oscillation scales in that it required pilot feedback ratings using a “yes-or-no” flow 
diagram structure. The purpose of the scale was to determine whether the MRAC induced any 
noticeable annoyances in its baseline, healthy-aircraft configuration. In some cases, the same 
simulated failure was rated as either a “major” or “minor” deficiency, depending on the pilot. 
Although five pilots varying from high-gain (aggressive) to low-gain (smooth and steady) in their 
pilot-input technique supported flight test activity, test result consistency could have been 
improved with a larger pilot evaluation group.   
 
Overall, MRAC full-scale flight-testing showed that increased complexity improved aircraft 
dynamics for simulated failures and restored performance similar to the un-failed aircraft.  An 
accepted handling qualities criterion for fixed-wing aircraft does not exist; however, based on 
metrics provided by United States Air Force Test Pilot for fixed-wing aircraft, the onMRAC+ 
controller had the largest reduction in coupling and was rated the same as the un-failed aircraft. 
8 Despite this improvement, however, increased complexity also showed an increase in adverse 
impact to pilot performance.7 This illustrates the importance of piloted, full-scale flight-testing to 
both validate predictions and identify unexpected tendencies. Fixes to correct these adverse 
interactions have been identified, but are not currently planned for flight-testing. More details of 
the MRAC flight-test results are described in references 7 and 9. In general, MRAC flight-testing 
showed that increased complexity improved aircraft dynamics for simulated failures and 
restored performance similar to the un-failed airplane. 
 
8. LESSONS LEARNED 
Many lessons learned can be taken from the success of the IRAC project which are 
indiscriminant to experiment types and are therefore beneficial to the overall flight-test 
community: 
 
1. Involve all project members as early as possible to bridge research requirement expectations 
among team members. 
 
 
 
2. Designed-in safety features can significantly reduce human factor effects on flight-test safety. 
 
3. Human factors cues are beneficial in highlighting reduced safety conditions due to stress 
factors or reduced situational awareness. 
 
4. A thoroughly documented control room training plan can be instrumental in ensuring 
continued situational awareness, consistency of culture, and well-understood roles and 
responsibilities no matter how experienced the test team. 
 
5. Expand simulation testing beyond specific test points to uncover potential safety impacts to 
flight due to unanticipated human-algorithm interactions during test point set-up maneuvers. 
 
6. A wide range of test pilots with varying stick input techniques is highly desired to better vet-
out controller compensation responses. 
 
7. Perform test point simulation testing as comparable to flight-test techniques as possible to 
uncover unanticipated technique effects to handling qualities. 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control adaptive flight controls project contributed to 
the relatively small set of adaptive control flight data available to the flight-test community. Such 
data provide additional aid to future control designers and their selection of the appropriate level 
of complexity for their application. Furthermore, the flight-test data provide a better 
understanding of potential interactions between pilots and adaptive systems. The validated and 
matured research systems and subsequent experiment development process have 
longstanding application in facilitating future project success as well as cross-program and 
cross-platform follow-on projects such as lightweight flexible structures. The rapid concept-to-
flight tempo with minimal mission success impacts and lack of safety issues was significantly 
supported by the incorporation of a variety of risk mitigation techniques into the life of the project 
and by making a safety-of-flight mindset common culture within the project team.  Lessons 
learned may offer improved safety involving further flight-testing of adaptive control laws. 
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